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ICTY COMPLETION STRATEGY 
¶1 On November 16, 2011, the ICTY released its current Completion Strategy Report. There 
are currently two cases in the pre-trial stages, seven at trial, one at partial retrial, and six on 
appeal. The ðorñević, Gotovina et al., and Perišić trials concluded in 2011. Six trials, and the 
Haradinaj retrial, are anticipated to conclude in 2012. The Karadžić trial should be completed in 
mid-2014. All appeals are to conclude by end-2015. On preliminary assessment, the Mladić trial 
will not commence before November 2012, and the Hadžic trial will begin in January 2013. 
There is no timetable for the completion of the Mladić and Hadžic trials. These completion goals 
are estimates, and further revisions of estimates are anticipated.  
¶2 Per Security Council Resolution 1966 of December 12, 2010, the International Residual 
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals will begin functioning for the ICTY on July 1, 2013. The 
Residual Mechanism will conduct all appeals proceedings against the judgment or sentence, and 
all appeals filed after July 1, 2013. The Residual Mechanism will similarly complete the work of 
the ICTR beginning July 1, 2012. The transfer schedule will rely on various factors, including 
the requisite resources and work processes the transfer of judicial and prosecutorial functions 
will entail, the Residual Mechanism’s own long-term interests, budgetary considerations, and the 
need for the Residual Mechanism to continually provide support and assistance. The ICTY and 
ICTR are working closely to ensure a smooth, efficient transition.  
A. Haradinaj et al., IT-04-84 and IT-04-84bis1 
1. Legal Highlights 
¶3 Prior to Haradinaj, the scope of retrial had only been addressed post-conviction, not post-
acquittal. The first issue the Haradinaj Court faced was determining what witnesses the Office of 
the Prosecutor (“OTP”) could call. OTP’s appeal was based on their inability to call two 
witnesses, Shefqut Kabashi and another, during the partial retrial. In his February 10, 2011, 
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Appeals Brief, Haradinaj argued that the OTP should only be allowed to call those two witnesses 
on appeal. Haradinaj asserted that this testimony should be held against the original trial. The 
Appeals Chamber held that all evidence may be introduced in the retrial. 
¶4 Second, the operative indictment had to be set. Haradinaj further moved that all allegations 
concerning incidents unrelated to Jablanica/Jabllanicë (“J/J”) be stricken from the fourth 
indictment. Likewise, Haradinaj moved to limit the alleged joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) to 
the J/J allegations from the broader JCE as alleged in the original trial and in the Revised 
Indictment. The Appeals Chamber ruled against both motions, with Judge Robinson dissenting.   
¶5 Balaj and Brahimaj moved (January 14, 2011 motion, Brahimaj January 31, 2011 joinder) 
for access to confidential materials in the Haraquija and Morina cases, pursuant to Rule 75(g). 
The OTP did not oppose this. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber denied this motion. These issues 
are discussed in greater detail below. 
¶6 Indictment and Case Status 
¶7 On April 3, 2008, Brahimaj was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, and Haradinaj and 
Balaj were fully acquitted. The OTP moved for a partial retrial because of their lack of 
opportunity to call two witnesses at trial. These witnesses would give testimony regarding 
participation in a JCE to commit crimes at KLA headquarters and the prison at J/J. The Revised 
Fourth Amended Indictment was filed on January 21, 2011, and re-charged Haradinaj and Balaj 
for crimes related to the KLA headquarters and the prison at J/J. 
2. Partial Retrial 
¶8 The partial retrial is presently ongoing. Balaj and Brahimaj filed their pre-trial briefs on 
July 11, 2011, and Haradinaj filed his on July 19, 2011. All three contest accuracy of all facts, 
and raise res judicata concerns and issues with evidence admissibility during the retrial. All three 
contended that “close association” was not enough for conviction. On July 22, 2011, the Court 
allowed admission of written testimony pursuant to Rule 92bis for all but two proposed 
witnesses. Stojanović and Stojanović (viva voce only) and Witnesses 78 and 79 were required to 
appear in person.  
¶9 Witness 75 expressed concerns to Mr. Harvey, counsel for Brahimaj, regarding his asylum 
case and the serious political persecution he would face in Kosovo, who relayed concerns to Mr. 
Rogers of the OTP.  
¶10 The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber failed to take sufficient steps to 
counter the witness intimidation that pervaded the trial, especially with regards to securing the 
potentially vital testimony of Kabashi and another witness. The Appeals Chamber limited retrial 
to acquittals on JCE participation, crimes committed at KLA headquarters in J/J, and related 
individual criminal responsibility.  
¶11 Judgment is expected in August 2012.  
3. Legal Highlights 
¶12 In arguing the OTP should only be allowed to call the two contested witnesses, Haradinaj 
contended that opening a case for a retrial is an extraordinary remedy and departs from the 
principles of finality, so “it should provide a tailored remedy [to] rectify a clearly identified error 
in the [trial] proceedings, and no more.” The Muvunyi Court admitted all evidence at retrial, but 
Haradinaj distinguished his appeal from the Muvunyi matter in that Muvunyi dealt with a retrial 
post-conviction, not post-acquittal. Haradinaj contended that all evidence that was admitted or 




deemed inadmissible at trial should stand as such, and that if the OTP were allowed to present 
new evidence at retrial it would circumvent Rule 115.  
¶13 The OTP argued that a retrial is a de novo hearing, which inherently includes the 
possibility of presenting new evidence. The OTP further argued that the retrial was tailored to the 
error in the first trial because it was limited to the J/J counts, and a “blanket restriction” would 
compound the error.  
¶14 The Appeals Chamber noted that neither Rule 117(C) nor the Muvunyi Decision mentioned 
the distinction Haradinaj argued, and the Muvunyi decision suggested that the new Trial 
Chamber has discretion to set the scope of admissible evidence in any retrial. The Appeals 
Chamber held evidence was not to be confined to the two witnesses, as evidentiary decisions 
might reflect the different scopes of the retrial and trial.  
¶15 Haradinaj next moved to overturn the Trial Chamber’s order that the alleged JCE not be 
limited to the narrower purpose of committing crimes at J/J, as the allegations unrelated to J/J 
were not appealed, and may not be re-litigated under res judicata. The Appeals Chamber held 
that no amendment should be made, because the retrial focused on “a narrower participation by 
the Accused in the JCE,” not a narrower JCE. Judge Robinson dissented to this holding on the 
basis of non bis in idem and res judicata, fearing that allowing the OTP to re-allege and attempt 
to prove guilt of allegations the Accused had already been acquitted of might prejudice the 
Accused.  
¶16 Haradinaj further moved to delete allegations from the Statement of Facts of Operative 
Indictment that were unrelated to the six counts being retried (specifically, those in paragraphs 
28(a)-(f) that made no reference to J/J) on the basis of res judicata, contending that inclusion 
would amount to abuse of process, violate the principle of finality, and allow evidence of 
allegations for which Haradinaj had been acquitted. Haradinaj moved that only evidence of the 
narrower JCE should be admissible.  
¶17 The OTP responded that despite the limited purpose of retrial, broader evidence was 
relevant to show that the alleged J/J crimes did not occur in isolation, to demonstrate Haradinaj’s 
criminal propensity, and to show that discretion over evidence admissibility rests with the Trial 
Chamber.  
¶18 The Appeals Chamber echoed its decision in holding that the alleged JCE need not be 
limited to the narrow purpose of committing crimes at J/J in that the allegations did not render 
the retrial unfair per se, and that the Trial Chamber should apply the rules of evidentiary 
admissibility with respect to undue prejudice.  
¶19 Lastly, the Trial Chamber rejected Balaj’s motion (with Brahimaj joining) seeking access 
to confidential material from Prosecutor v. Astrit Haraqija and Bajrush Morina, Case No. IT-04-
84-R77.4, pursuant to Rule 75(G). Judge Orie, the Presiding Judge of Haraqija and Morina, did 
not believe the requested information would materially assist Balaj and Brahimaj, and 
information as to witness credibility should not be provided by the OTP. Chamber held that no 
there was no legitimate forensic purpose with regards to the materials.  




B. Šainović et al (formerly Milutinović et al) – IT-05-872 
1. Indictment and Case Status 
¶20 On May 27, 2009, Defendants Šainović, Pavković, Lukić, Ojdanić, and Lazarević filed 
Notices of Appeal. The same day, the OTP filed its Notice of Appeal against each Accused 
except Milutinović, who was acquitted on all counts. Each Defendant moved for a not guilty 
verdict, and the OTP moved for the Appeals Chamber to quash the imposed sentences and 
impose more severe sentences, citing the sentences imposed in Martić and Brñanin. During 
2011, Defendants Lukić and Šainović filed various motions of appeal in the Appeals Chamber. 
The next status conference will be held on January 12, 2012, and there are no pending motions. 
The ICTY aims to issue judgment in July 2013.  
¶21 Judgment was rendered on February 26, 2009. Milutinović was acquitted on all charges. 
Šainović, Pavković, and Lukić were each sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment for  
¶22 deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder, persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds under article 5, and murder under article 3. Ojdanić and Lazarević 
were each sentenced to 15 years for deporation and other inhumane acts (forcible transfer) under 
article 5. The June 21, 2006 indictment charged Milutinović, Šainović, Ojdanić, Pavković, 
Lazarević and Lukić for individual criminal responsibility under article 7(1) of the Statute, and 
superior criminal responsibility under article 7(3). The Accused were charged with crimes 
against humanity, including deportation, other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), murder, 
persecutions on political or religious under article 5, and murder under article 3. 
2. 2011 Activity 
¶23 Lukić moved to vary the grounds of his appeal on December 17, 2010. The OTP argued 
that Lukić failed to provide good cause for why the “new” grounds of appeal were not included 
in his May 27, 2009 Notice of Appeal, per Rule 108. The Appeals Chamber rejected Lukić’s 
motion, holding that Lukić did not present specific “good cause,” and no explanation as to the 
substantial performance of each variation would be necessary to “avoid a miscarriage of justice.” 
¶24 On June 14, 2011, Lukić filed a second motion for leave to vary grounds of appeal. Lukić 
argued he did not have adequate opportunity to contribute to his Notice of Appeal and Appeal 
Brief due to a delayed trial judgment translation. Lukić claims he found errors related to 
interpretation, disregard of evidence, credibility of evidence, and misrepresentation of evidence. 
The OTP submitted on July 1, 2011 that good cause was not shown, and Lukić failed to explain 
his unique ability to review. The Appeals Chambers denied this motion based on Lukić’s failure 
to both specifically explain the relevance of his particular knowledge to his amendments, and to 
show his Counsel’s inadequacy in identifying errors. 
C. Prlić et al., IT-04-743 
1. Indictment and Case Status 
¶25 The Prlić Defendants are awaiting judgment. Judgment is expected in June 2012. The 
Second Amended Indictment was filed on June 11, 2008, and charged Prlić, Stojić, Praljak, 
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Petković, Ćorić, and Pušić for individual criminal responsibility under article 7(1) of the Statute 
of the Tribunal, superior criminal responsibility under article 7(3), grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions (article 2), violations of the laws or customs of war (article 3), and crimes against 
humanity (article 5). 
¶26 Closing arguments took place between February 7, and March 2, 2011, and all parties filed 
final trial briefs between March 28, and April 1, 2011. Each Defendant argued for full acquittal. 
Petković and Ćorić entered preliminary mitigation considerations. OTP asserted that Prlić, Stojić, 
Praljak, and Petković should be sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment, Ćorić to 35 years, and 
Pušić to 25 years.  
2. Legal Highlights 
¶27 Prlić moved for provisional release until judgment on March 31, 2011. Rule 65(B) of the 
original ICTY Rules on Procedure and Evidence stated that for provisional release, the Accused 
must (1) neither present a flight risk nor be likely to influence or endanger persons while 
released, and (2) present a sufficient humanitarian reason for release. Prlić argued that he did not 
present a flight risk in light of his compliance with previous provisional releases granted, he did 
not be present as the Chamber was not in session, and cited “sufficiently compelling 
humanitarian reasons,” appealing to the presumption of innocence and right to a fair trial, and the 
fact that the lengthy trial had taken a large physical and psychological toll on him. The OTP 
contended that risk of flight would be heightened as the trial was ending, that Prlić failed to 
present valid humanitarian reasons, and that Appeals Chamber case law opposed provisional 
release.  
¶28 The Appeals Chamber noted that the Republic of Croatia made assurances that Prlić would 
comply in returning to The Hague when required, and would not influence or endanger persons 
when released. The Chamber agreed with these assertions. The first criterion of Rule 65(B) was 
satisfied on this basis. The Appeals Chamber appealed to the principles of human rights from the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights as international law to evaluate whether there 
were compelling humanitarian concerns. These authorities supported lenient detention measures 
when sufficient, and focused on whether deprivation of liberty was justified. Despite these 
authorities, the Appeals Chamber held that Rule 65(B) was binding authority. Prlić failed to 
satisfy his Rule 65(B) burden to present sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons, so 
provisional release was denied. Presiding Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti intends to attach a dissent 
to this decision.      
¶29 Praljak also moved for provisional release on April 7, 2011 pursuant to Rule 65(B). Praljak 
further argued that the “sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons” requirement in Rule 65(B) 
for provisional release was flawed. The OTP objected on the same grounds as it did to Prlić’s 
motion. The Appeals Chamber denied this motion on similar grounds to their denial of Prlić’s 
provisional release.  
¶30 Prlić again moved for provisional release until final judgment on October 31, 2011. The 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated it did not object to Prlić’s motion on November 3, 
and the OTP objected on November 14 to Prlić’s provisional release for an indefinite time 
period. OTP argued that the Chamber’s discretion had to be in line with the Tribunal’s 
application of a principal of proportionality to determining the duration of provisional release 
with respect to the defendant’s provided justification. On November 15, 2011, Prlić moved for 




provisional release to Zagreb from December 15, to January 15, 2012. Prlić and OTP argued 
over the applicability of the Rule 65(B) “compelling humanitarian grounds” clause.  
¶31 On October 28, 2011, Rule 65(B) was amended to read, “the existence of sufficiently 
compelling humanitarian grounds may be considered in granting [provisional] release.” Prlić and 
OTP argued over this amendment. Prlić contended that the choice to consider humanitarian 
concerns was at the Chamber’s discretion, and the OTP argued that at an advanced stage of 
proceedings, humanitarian concerns must be considered, and that the conclusion of the hearing 
did not justify provisional release. The Trial Chamber emphasized their discretion in determining 
provisional release, and cited Prlić’s lengthy pretrial detention and likely substantial deliberation 
period before judgment. Trial Chamber partially granted Prlić’s motion—they held Rule 65(B) to 
be satisfied, and issued a provisional release confined to Zagreb for three months with the 
possibility of extension.  
¶32 Petković moved for provisional release on November 14, 2011. After argument and 
discussion similar to Prlić’s motion, the Trial Chamber granted Petković a three-month 
provisional release under 24-hour surveillance to Split, Croatia.  
D. Ratko Mladić, IT-09-924 
1. Indictment and Arrest 
¶33 Ratko Mladić was appointed Commander of the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army 
(VRS) on May 12, 1992, and was promoted to Colonel General in June, 1994. Mladić was 
alleged to be the most senior officer of the VRS, as Commander of the Main Staff. On July 24, 
1995, Mladić was indicted for genocide, crimes against humanity, and various war crimes, 
including those related to an alleged sniping campaign against Sarajevo civilians. On November 
16, 1995, the indictment was expanded to include war crime charges for the July 1995 attack on 
Srebrenica. The Trial Chamber reviewed the indictment and the OTP’s evidence, and found that 
the evidence provided reasonable grounds for a belief of guilt. Subsequently, the Chambers 
issued an international arrest warrant pursuant to Rule 61 on July 11, 1996. 
¶34 From the date of issuance of this arrest warrant, Mladić was deemed a fugitive, and could 
not be located. On May 26, 2011, Mladić was arrested in Lazarevo, in the Banat region of the 
northern province of Vojvodina, by Serbian special police officers and agents of the Security 
Information Agency and War Crimes Prosecutor’s Office. The Tribunal noted that Serbia’s 
failure to arrest Mladić undermined Serbia’s credibility and its expressed commitment to 
cooperate with the Tribunal. This long delay directly created an obstacle to the Tribunal’s 
commitment to international justice.  
¶35 The Third Amended Indictment (“Indictment”) was filed on October 20, 2011. The 
indictment charged Mladić on the basis of individual and superior criminal responsibility under 
articles 7(1) and 7(3), with two counts of genocide under article 4, persecutions, extermination, 
murder, deportation, inhumane acts, terror, unlawful attacks on civilians, and taking of hostages 
under articles 3 and 5. 
¶36 The indictment alleged that from May 12, 1992, to November 30, 1995, Mladić was 
involved in a JCE to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The indictment further alleged that in the same time frame Mladić participated in 
another JCE to establish and carry out a campaign of sniping and shelling against Sarajevo 
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civilians to spread terror. The indictment further alleged that Mladić participated in a JCE to 
eliminate Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing the men and boys, and removing women, 
young children, and some elderly, from just before July 11, 1995 to November 1, 1995. Lastly, 
the indictment alleged that from May 1995 to June 1995, Mladić participated in a JCE to take 
U.N. personnel hostage to prevent NATO from ordering air strikes. 
¶37 On October 13, 2011, the Trial Chamber granted the OTP’s request to amend the 
indictment to include crimes committed in Bišina. This incident provided a new basis for 
conviction on charged counts of genocide, persecution, extermination, and murder as a crime 
against humanity and war crimes. On November 18, OTP moved pursuant to Rule 73bis to 
reduce the third indictment to limit their presentation of evidence to 106 of the 196 crimes as this 
reduced presentation would suffice in establishing a basis for conviction for all eleven counts in 
the Third Indictment. The operative Fourth Amended Indictment was filed on December 16, 
2011, and reflected the above two amendments. Mladić has pled not guilty to the indictment.  
2. Pre-Trial Stage 
¶38 On June 3, 2011, the OTP moved to restrict the Defense’s public disclosure of information 
and material that the OTP had provided, and sought privacy and protective orders to restrict 
disclosure about the whereabouts of the OTP’s victims and witnesses in the interests of justice. 
To the second aspect of the OTP’s motion, the Defense argued that the OTP must “show 
exceptional circumstances for a variation of its disclosure obligations.”  
¶39 The Trial Chamber granted the first part of the OTP’s motion in the interests of justice so 
as not to preclude the effectiveness of any future motions to seek specific protective measures by 
the OTP. The Chamber rejected the Defense’s parallel comparison to the Milošević case, as that 
decision concerned the “identifying information of witnesses, [not] the current whereabouts of 
victims and witnesses whose identities are known to the Defence.” The Chamber noted the 
importance of ensuring protection and privacy and the lack of implications to the Defense’s 
preparations, and restricted disclosure as requested pursuant to article 20 of the Statute of the 
Tribunal and Rules 53 and 75.  
¶40 On August 16, 2011, the OTP requested leave to sever the Second Indictment and conduct 
two trials: the first dealing with the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and the Bišina Crimes, and the 
second with other atrocities from the 1992-95 Bosnian War, citing Rule 54 and considerations of 
justice. Mladić opposed severance, arguing that holding two trials against a single Accused was 
inconsistent with the Tribunal’s jurisprudence and was not dealt with by the Statute or Rules, 
severance would be illegal under the SFRY Criminal Procedure Code, severance should only be 
granted if an Accused was prejudiced by joinder of the charges, and that severance would violate 
Accused’s right to a fair trial. In its reply, the OTP argued that Rule 72(A)(iii) provided a basis 
for severance, that the principle of legality applied only to substantive criminal law, and that the 
SFRY Code was not controlling or applicable authority.  
¶41 The Trial Chamber noted that it had authority to sever joined charges, and that it could join 
against a single Accused either by granting leave to amend a proposed indictment prior to the 
Accused’s initial appearance, or upon motion, per the Appeals Chamber’s holding in Milošević. 
The Trial Chamber found the following relevant factors: (1) potential prejudice to the right to a 
fair trial (Statute articles 20 and 21), (2) relative manageability of one versus separate trials and 
other factors in the interests of justice, and (3) potential burden on witnesses. The principle of 
legality, health concerns, and a speedy resolution were not relevant to the Chamber’s decision. 
The Trial Chamber denied the OTP’s motion to sever, noting there was no compelling reason to 




do so, severance might prejudice the Accused, witnesses might be unduly burdened, and trials 
likely would be less manageable and less efficient.  
¶42 Mladić’s deteriorating health has impeded his court appearances. It has also affected the 
Trial Chambers’ duty to prepare for and conduct his trial, and ensure that trial would be fair and 
expeditious. Since October 5, 2011, Mladić has been treated for pneumonia, which resulted in a 
one-week hospitalization, a hernia, had several teeth removed, and will be treated for kidney 
stones. Mladić has suffered three strokes since 1996. On November 9, Mladić consented to 
release of his complete medical records to Chambers and Registry. Pursuant to Rules 54 and 
74bis, the Trial Chamber ordered a comprehensive physical and mental evaluation of Mladić, 
and review of health records, to be filed confidentially by December 6, 2011.  
E. Goran Hadžić (IT-04-75)5 
1. Background  
¶43 Arrested on July 20, 2011, Goran Hadžić was the last major figure implicated in the crimes 
stemming from the 1992-1995 Bosnian War to still be at large. Specifically, Hadžić has been 
implicated as a member of a Serbian “Joint Criminal Enterprise” (“JCE”), the purpose of which 
was the ethnic cleansing via the removal of Croats and other non-Serbian nationals from 
particular areas deemed as Serbian during the war. According to the Tribunal, this particular JCE 
came into existence no later than April 1, 1991, and continued until December 1993.  The 
Prosecution contended that Hadžić’s involvement with the JCE lasted from June 1991 until 
December 1993. The JCE was part of the larger civil war that followed the breakup of the former 
Yugoslavia, and the factions largely broke down along stringent ethnic and religious lines. The 
purpose of the Serbian JCE was to create an ethnically pure living space for Serbs only. During 
the period in question, Hadžić was proclaimed the President of the Serbian Autonomous Region 
of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem (“SAO SBWS”). He was subsequently declared the 
President of the proclaimed Republic of the Serbian Krajina (“RSK”), in present-day Croatia. 
2. Indictment: Legal Highlights, Theories of Liability 
¶44 The initial indictments against Hadžić were issued on June 4, 2004, and were made public 
on July 16, 2004. An amended indictment was filed on July 22, 2011. Hadžić was transferred to 
the ICTY chambers on July 22, 2011. He was charged under articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY Statute 
for crimes directed against non-Serbian residents of the Krajina region. His article 5 indictments 
for crimes against humanity included the following: persecution on political, racial or religious 
grounds; extermination; murder; imprisonment; torture; inhumane acts; deportation; and forcible 
transfer. His article 3 indictments, for violations of the law or customs of war, included the 
following: murder; torture; cruel treatment; wanton destruction of villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity; destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to 
education and religion; and plunder of private or public property.  
¶45 The Prosecution aimed to find Hadžić individually and personally liable for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed in the furtherance of the JCE’s goals. The Prosecution 
did not contend that Hadžić necessarily physically committed any of the alleged crimes; rather, 
they based his liability off his position of authority, and alleged that he “planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed and/or aided and abetted” the actual crimes that did occur. The Prosecution 
                                                 
5 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Goran Hadžić, IT-04-75, http://www.icty.org/case/hadzic/4. 




looked to Hadžić’s position as leader and an organizer of the JCE, and of governmental bodies 
and police organizations whose purpose it was to carry out the goals of the JCE, to personally 
implicate him in any and all criminal results of this JCE that followed. They highlighted the fact 
that, as a presidential figure, Hadžić had effective control and authority over the Serbian forces 
that carried out crimes in furtherance of the JCE’s objectives. 
¶46 In particular, the Prosecution contended that by participating in the JCE, Hadžić had the 
intent that the goals of, and attendant crimes stemming from, the JCE would occur. The 
Prosecution also contended that, in the alternative, Hadžić and others in charge of the JCE 
knowingly took the risk that it was foreseeable that certain crimes would be committed by others 
in the furtherance of the JCE’s end goal, and that through his awareness of certain possible 
results, Hadžić participated in the JCE. The Prosecution, for some of the counts, were imputing 
to him a lower but still culpable mens rea of knowledge or recklessness with regards to some of 
the crimes. The Prosecution also contended that Hadžić had knowledge and evidence that crimes 
had been committed by Serbian forces, and failed to appropriately use his authority prevent the 
commission of crimes against non-Serbian populations, or punish those who did, thus 
implicating his support, approval of and involvement in said crimes.  
3. Procedural Background 
¶47 The presiding judges in the case are Guy Delvoie, Burton Hall, and Antoine Esia-Mbe 
Mindua. As the case against Hadžić is just commencing, there have been no judgments made. On 
July 22, 2011, in the wake of Hadžić’s arrest, an order was granted to list the confidentiality of 
the indictments against him.  
¶48 On August 23, 2011, the Tribunal granted the Prosecution’s motion requesting that the 
confidentiality of any material provided to the Hadžić Defense by the Prosecution be maintained. 
This would bar the Hadžić team from disclosing to any third party or the public any information 
received from the Prosecution. The motion also requested that any information that could 
disclose the whereabouts of protected witnesses be redacted from documents given to Hadžić’s 
team. The motion was granted under articles 21(2) and 22 of the Statute, which provide for the 
protection of victims and witnesses of the relevant prosecuted crimes. The Court found that it 
was appropriate in these circumstances to restrict information about witnesses to the crime. The 
Court also ordered that the Hadžić team could not contact witnesses identified by the Prosecution 
without prior written notice to the Prosecution, so that the Prosecution would have time to take 
the needed steps to protect the identity and/or location of witnesses.  
4. Pre-Trial Plan 
¶49 On November 29, 2011, the presiding Judge Guy Delvoie issued an order scheduling the 
entirety of the cases’ pre-trial preparation, and establishing various procedural deadlines with 
which the parties must comply. Upon further consideration and consultation with the parties, 
Judge Delvoie re-issued an amended pre-trial schedule on December 16, 2011, which shortened 
the pre-trial window by three months. On January 31, 2012, the parties are scheduled to file 
information regarding facts agreed upon by both sides. The final pre-trial conference is set to 
occur on October 15, 2012, with the actual trial set to commence on October 16, 2012. 




F. Stanišić and Župljanin (IT-08-91) “Bosnia and Herzegovina”6 
1. Background 
¶50 Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin were charged together for crimes committed against 
non-Serbian populations in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their alleged participation in 
crimes against humanity and war crimes occurred during the 1992-1995 civil war in the former 
Yugoslav Republic. The Prosecution for the Tribunal contended that they were part of a Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”), carried out by the nascent Serbian government, against non-Serbian 
populations in specific regions earmarked as a future Serbian state. Starting in April 1992, 
Stanišić was the Minister for the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Župljanin was the Chief of Regional Security Services Center (“CSB”) of Banja Luka in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a member of the Autonomous Region of Krajina Crisis Staff, and 
an advisor to the President of the Serbian Republic (“Republika Srpksa”).  
2. Indictment  
¶51 The initial indictments against Stanišić and Župljanin were issued on February 25, 2005, 
and were made public on March 10, 2005. Between 2005 and 2009, indictments against the two 
went through many amendments and consolidations; the final version of the indictment was 
issued September 10, 2009.The Prosecution under articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute has 
charged the parties. They have been charged with both individual and superior criminal 
responsibility for crimes including the following: under article 5, crimes against humanity, 
persecution, murder, extermination, torture, inhumane acts including forcible transfer, and 
deportation. Under article 3, violations of the laws and customs of war, they have been charged 
with murder, torture, and cruel treatment. 
3. Legal Highlights and Theories  
¶52 Trial is currently underway; as such, no judgments against the parties have been rendered. 
This year the proceedings against them have been subject to several inter-case requests for 
material; similarly, the Stanišić and Župljanin teams have requested information from other trials 
pertinent to the proceedings against them. The Stanišić and Župljanin teams have requested 
material from the Karadžić case. Additionally, the Defense Team representing Franko Simatović 
requested ongoing access to confidential inter-parte and ex parte Prosecution and Defense 
materials entered into the Stanišić and Župljanin case. Jovica Stanišić’s Defense Team also 
requested ongoing access to confidential material tendered in the case against Stanišić and 
Župljanin. 
¶53 In reviewing the requests by all parties above-named, the Court established that for a case 
to gain access to confidential information from another ongoing trial, the party making the 
motion must demonstrate that there is a close nexus between the facts and legal issues of one 
case and those of the other. Such nexus must demonstrate a legitimate forensic purpose such that 
access to the information will aid in the case of the party requesting the information. The Courts 
generally require that there be some geographical and temporal, or other “material,” overlap 
between the cases. Inter parte information is generally granted on a showing by the applicant of 
the above criteria. Access to confidential ex parte material, however, generally requires a higher 
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showing of connection and necessity than a geographic or temporal overlap, and a higher need 
than legitimate forensic purpose. The reason behind the higher standards for ex parte material is 
the material’s elevated level of confidentiality, such that those witnesses and parties providing ex 
parte evidence have been assured of a greater level of discretion with respect to the information 
they have provided.  
¶54 Inter-parte information requested by the above-named parties was uniformly found to meet 
the necessary criteria, and the parties requesting such material were granted access. However, 
requests for ex parte information were summarily rejected, with the Court citing the applicants’ 
failure to demonstrate a pressing enough evidentiary need based on the elevated confidentiality 
criteria of this information. The crux of the Court’s allowing of the cross-case transfer of 
material seems to be that all the parties involved have been implicated as having acted within the 
large, Serbian government-produced, JCE against non-Serbian populations. Thus, while all 
parties are being tried separately, they are all implicated in the same crimes, and during the 
commission of said crimes, had interconnected relationships and dealings with the other 
members of the JCE. Thus it seems unsurprising that evidence from one case necessarily relates 
to many other cases now pending at the ICTY. 
¶55 On February 1, 2011, the Prosecution rested its case against Stanišić and Župljanin, which 
had begun on September 14, 2009.  The Defense began its case on April 11, 2011.  On July 8, 
2011, however, the Prosecution filed a motion to allow additional evidence (12 additional 
documents) for their case, pursuant to Rules 73 and 89(c) of the governing trial and evidence 
procedures at the Tribunal. The Defense objected to the admission of new evidence after the 
Prosecution already rested its case. To support this argument, they put forth the legal theory that 
to admit fresh evidence after presenting a full case, the Prosecution must prove, per an appeals 
decision in the Prlić case, that “exceptional circumstances” exist such that, in the interest of 
justice, additional material should be admitted. The documents in question purport to corroborate 
witness testimony about the detention and treatment of non-Serb civilians during the JCE. The 
Defense contended that such documents were not on the initial evidence list, and therefore, as the 
case was closed, no longer available for admission. 
¶56 The Prlić decision related to evidence not admitted during the Prosecution’s initial case, 
but was evidence that was tendered by the Prosecution during its cross-examination of Defense 
witnesses. The Court expressly rejected the idea that the Prlić decision required a showing of 
exceptional circumstances, and instead held that admission of such documents could be granted 
so long as the Prosecution explained why the new evidence was not admitted during its primary 
case, and why they were now seeking to admit the evidence through the cross-examination of a 
particular witness. The Court stated “there is no ban on the Prosecution tendering evidence 
during the cross-examination of a witness.” New evidence will be reviewed by the Court and 
admitted or excluded on a case by case basis, after the Court has weighed the evidence in light of 
the Accused’s right to a fair trial, and the Prosecution’s duty to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. New evidence will be admitted or excluded as “it is in the interest of justice” 
to do so. After evaluation, the Court granted admission to all but two of the new documents 
tendered by the Prosecution. 
¶57 On November 18, 2011, the Court granted Mićo Stanišić’s request for a provisional release 
during the Court’s winter recess, which coincided with the winter holidays and New Year. 
Traditionally, as per an Appeal’s Court ruling, provisional releases under Rule 65(B) of Accused 
persons during trial were limited to cases in which the Accused has presented compelling issues 
of “humanitarian grounds.” However, the Trial Court noted a recent amendment to Rule 65(B), 




which established that humanitarian grounds was not a required element of granting release, but 
was rather another element that the Court could consider when deciding to grant release. Citing 
compliant behavior by Stanišić during the trial, the Court granted his provisional release, which 
began on December 19, 2011, and finished on January 9, 2012. 
4. Case History 
¶58 Mićo Stanišić’s defense team rested its case in the Trial Chamber on July 20, 2011. 
G. Gotovina, Čermak, Markač (IT-06-90) “Operation Storm”7 
1. Background 
¶59 The case against Gotovina, et. al. centered on their involvement with a Croatian JCE to 
depopulate the Knin region in Krajina, in present-day Croatia, of Serbs and other non-Croat 
civilians who populated the area. The goal was to create an ethnically pure area for Croats to 
repopulate. The impetus for this JCE seems to stem from or be in retaliation to a similar JCE 
committed against Croats by Serbs in the same region early in the civil war. Towards the end of 
the civil war, Croatian forces retook the Krajina back from Serbian forces, and it was upon this 
acquisition of land that the JCE allegedly commenced. The Prosecution argued that the Croatian 
JCE began in July 1995 and continued until sometime in September 1995. The Prosecution 
alleged that Gotovina, et. al., were directly part of formulating the plans and policies that led to 
the commission of the JCE. 
2. Indictments 
¶60 Ante Gotovina was indicted for both crimes against humanity and violations of the laws 
and customs of war. His article 5 indictments, for crimes against humanity, included the 
following: persecution, deportation, murder, and inhumane acts. His article 3 indictments, for 
violations of the laws and customs of war, included the following: plunder of private and public 
property, wanton destruction, murder and cruel treatment.  
¶61 Ivan Čermak was indicted for persecution, deportation, murder and inhumane acts as 
crimes against humanity, and plunder, wanton destruction, murder and cruel treatment as 
violations of the laws and customs of war.  
¶62 Markač was indicted with the exact same charges as were charged against Gotovina, for 
both crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war. 
¶63 The trial against the three parties closed with a verdict rendered on April 15, 2011.  
3. Judgments: Legal Highlights and Theories 
¶64 The Tribunal found that the guilty parties were part of a larger JCE, “Operation Storm,” in 
which many high level Croatian governmental officials had participated. The Court found 
Gotovina guilty on all charges but inhumane acts (specifically forcible transfer) as a crime 
against humanity, and sentenced him to 24 years in prison. He was given credit for the 1956 days 
he had served in prison during his trial. Markač was also convicted by the Tribunal of all counts 
against him except inhumane acts (specifically forcible transfer) as a crime against humanity, 
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and he was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. He also received credit for the 1477 days he had 
served in prison during his trial. Čermak was acquitted of all charges brought against him, and 
was released by the Tribunal at the close of trial. 
4. Gotovina: 
¶65 As Colonel General of the military, Gotovina was head of Croatian military operations, 
including Operation Storm, and was also Commander of the Split Military District during the 
indictment period. As such, he held a vast amount of exclusive control over the Croatian military 
forces. The Court found that he, along with President Franjo Tudjman and other top government 
and military leaders, planned Operation Storm at a spring 1995 meeting, the “Brioni” meeting. 
The Court found that this meeting created Operation Storm with the express purpose that Serbian 
civilians would leave the areas now under Croatian control. 
¶66 Much of Gotovina’s guilt did not stem from direct physical implementation of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. The Court found that it was mostly lower police and military 
forces that were carrying out specific attacks on Serbian civilians and property. However, the 
Court found that, as head of the military forces carrying out illegal attacks, he was responsible 
for the actions or crimes that he knew or should have known to be foreseeable consequences of 
the ultimate goal of Operation Storm. The Court found that Gotovina’s failure to prevent or 
punish these crimes against civilians, was evidence of his desire or intent that these crimes be 
carried out in furtherance of the ultimate, desired outcome of Operation Storm. The Brioni 
meeting was pivotal to the Prosecution’s case, and the Tribunal’s ultimate guilty verdict against 
Gotovina. Gotovina’s active participation of the planning of Operation Storm expressed a 
specific intent on the part of Gotovina that the end goals of Operation Storm—eviction and 
depopulation of non-Croat civilians—should be carried out, and implicated him as a driving 
force behind creating the situation in which war crimes and other crimes were able to be carried 
out with impunity. Thus, Gotovina was personally held responsible for crimes that were mostly 
physically carried out by persons other than himself.  
¶67 The Court did find a few instances where Gotovina did directly participate in crimes 
against the non-Croat populations. The Court found that Gotovina specifically ordered the 
artillery shelling of areas in the region that were purely residential, and had no direct military 
purpose other than to drive out civilian residents of said regions. In an interesting interpretation 
of “deportation,” the Court found that this shelling, along with other crimes and intimidations 
against the resident populations, amounted to deportation and forcible transfer of persons. The 
Croatian forces did not “round up” or physically deport non-Croat populations from the area. In 
the strictest sense of the word, the Serbs’ evacuation was “voluntary,” and some did stay behind. 
But the Court found that purposeful creation of a dangerous and chaotic situation, in which 
staying behind put resident populations at great peril, amounted to deportation. The actions of the 
Croat military forces created an environment in which staying behind became impossible and not 
really a choice, but for those people, generally the elderly and sick, who could not leave. The 
environment created by Gotovina’s command was specifically meant to drive Serbs and others 
out of the region, and because it did so, the actions leading to it qualified as deportation.  
5. Markač: 
¶68 The Court’s reasoning against Markač followed much of the same logic as that used 
against Gotovina. Markač was Assistant Minister of the Interior in charge of Special Police 




matters, and as such had effective control over the on-the-ground operations of the special police 
operating in the Krajina region. It was found during the course of the trial that the Croatian 
special police forces were involved in many of the on-the-ground crimes against Serbian and 
other non-Croat populations. The Court found that Markač was also involved in the Brioni 
meeting, and knew about the commission of crimes by those under his control during Operation 
Storm. His participation in the planning of Operation Storm, as well as his failure to prevent or 
punish crimes arising from Operation Storm, showed the Court that he implicitly intended that 
these crimes be committed in furtherance of Operation Storm’s ultimate goal of an ethnically 
clean Krajina. Additionally, the Court found that Markač had an express duty to prevent war 
crimes from occurring, and to investigate and punish those who did carry out crimes contrary to 
international humanitarian and military laws. That he failed to do so, said the Court, created an 
environment where such activities were implicitly condoned. For these reasons, he was convicted 
as personally implicated in the actions of his subordinates.  
6. Čermak: 
¶69 The Court acquitted Čermak based on the fact that, during Operation Storm, he had very 
little effective control over the situation on the ground, and therefore could not prevent the 
crimes from occurring. As Commander of the Knin Garrison, Čermak held some responsibility 
over the local police and military. The Court found, however, that he did not have any legal 
authority to command or punish the forces engaged in Operation Storm. He was only in charge 
of his own garrison troops and the Court found that there was no evidence linking his own troops 
to any of the crimes against the Serb population, and that he could not have prevented the actions 
committed by troops not under his direct command. 
¶70 The Court found that Čermak’s primary role during Operation Storm was to provide relief 
and infrastructure in the wake of Operation Storm, to see to it that areas were de-mined, to 
reinstate electricity and water, etc. He was also in charge of providing information about the 
situation on the ground to international observers of the situation. The Court found that Čermak 
provided misleading statements to the international community that crimes against Serbs and 
other non-Serb civilians would be investigated and halted, and he deliberately concealed certain 
specific crimes committed on August 25, 1995. The Court found, however, that despite these 
misleading statements there was no evidence suggesting Čermak intended that his actions to go 
further than the goals of Operation Storm, or crimes committed in its name. Rather, the Court 
found that Čermak, in making representations to the international community, overstated his 
authority as garrison commander, and probably could not have prevented or punished the crimes 
being committed by other military and police forces. His misrepresentation of the situation on 
the ground, however, did not amount to the commission of the crimes for which he had been 
indicted. 
7. Post-Trial and Appeals  
¶71 The trial of Gotovina, et al. has now closed. The case against Gotovina and Markač are 
now pending in the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal. From reading the few motions Gotovina’s 
defense team has brought to the Court, it seems that Gotovina is challenging certain aspects of 
his conviction – notably, the Court’s finding of forcible deportation of non-Croat populations. 
The Defense argues that the Trial Court erred in both law and fact in finding that there were no 
other reasonable explanations for the shelling of targets in Knin, other than to forcibly remove 




Serbs from the area. In particular, the Defense argued that the Trial Court’s finding that 94.5 
percent of the shelling done in and around Knin was directed towards military targets was 
inconsistent with their finding of a deliberate attack on civilian, non-combative populations. The 
Defense cited reports by the U.N. and U.S. that purported to claim to find no evidence of 
unlawful shelling. Gotovina’s Defense also suggested that the Trial Court erred in law and fact 
when it found that he was part of the JCE and contributed to its execution. The Defense 
specifically took issue with the Trial Court’s finding that Gotovina specifically agreed to commit 
the crimes for which he has been convicted. The Defense also challenged the Lower Court’s 
finding that Gotovina failed to take the necessary steps to prevent and punish crimes committed 
by subordinates, and as such expressly contributed to their commission. 
¶72 More interestingly, the Markač Defense Team challenged the notion that there even was a 
JCE in its appellant brief. Markač’s position suggested that the Trial Court erred in law and fact 
when it found that the Brioni meeting established an understood program of Serbian elimination 
as part of Operation Storm. Markač contended that the Trial Court’s conclusion that the goals of 
Operation Storm amounted to ethnic cleansing were drawn from faulty inference, and claimed 
that the available evidence did not suggest that such an understanding amongst Croatian 
leadership existed. In the alternative, however, the Markač Defense claimed that even in the 
event of the existence of a JCE, the Trial Court misapplied legal standards to the case, and drew 
inferences and conclusions that were prejudicial to Markač and were unsupported by the 
evidentiary record. 
¶73 Gotovina’s defense team has submitted requests to the Court to force the government of 
Serbia to turn over certain documents pertaining to why the Serbs left the Krajina region during 
Operation Storm. However, because the Appeals Chamber found that the Defense failed to 
provide a compelling reason as to why new evidence was needed, the Appeals Chamber rejected 
this motion and noted that the Appeals Chamber was not the locale for a trial de novo of fact.  
¶74 On January 6, 2012, the Appeals Court issued a scheduling order to the parties, requesting 
that they appear before the bench on January 26, 2012, for a status conference. 
H. Tolimir (IT-05-88/2) “Srebrenica”8 
1. Background and Indictments  
¶75  Zdravko Tolimir was the Commander for Intelligence and Security of the Bosnian Serb 
Army (VRS) during the Bosnian-Serb war of 1992-1995, which occurred in present-day Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Tolimir reported directly to General Ratko Mladić of the VRS. Tolimir has 
been implicated in an effort by Serb forces during the struggles to ethnically cleanse Bosnia of its 
Muslim population. The Tribunal indicted Tolimir for genocide by acts or omissions to destroy 
the Bosnian Muslim Population, through planned summary executions and forced movements. 
He has also been indicted for conspiracy to commit genocide, forcible transfer and deportation, 
and persecution on racial, religious, or political grounds. Lastly, he has been indicted under 
articles 3 and 5, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws and customs of war, for 
extermination and murder.  
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2. Legal Highlights and Theories  
¶76 This year, the Prosecution filed a motion with the Court to allow written testimony against 
Tolimir by “Witness 39,” in place of the physical presence of Witness 39 at cross-examination 
by the Defense. The Prosecution claimed in their motion that Witness 39 suffered from post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), resulting from his or her experiences during the Bosnian war. 
The Prosecution asserted that Witness 39 as functionally unable to testify in person at trial, as 
having to testify in person about the events in question would lead the witness to relive the 
experience, and trigger an episode of his or her PTSD. The Prosecution contended that for all 
purposes the witness was disabled such that they were unable to testify by reason of a 
psychological condition.  
¶77 The Court, noting that Witness 39’s testimony was relevant and probative of the existence 
of a JCE against Bosnian Muslims, denied the Prosecution’s motion. The Court held that the 
Prosecution’s assertion that the witness suffered from PTSD was not enough to bar an in-person 
cross-examination. The Court noted that the Prosecution did not provide medical certification 
attesting to the witness’s condition and unfitness to testify, and stated that the Prosecution’s 
inability to “prevail upon” or convince the witness to come forward was not enough to prevent 
the Court’s compelling said witness to the stand.  
¶78 The Court relied on a standard of objective unavailability in reaching its decision. This 
standard stems from Rule 92 quarter, which defines an “unavailable person” as someone who is 
“by reason of bodily condition unable to testify orally.” The Court held that in the present case, it 
did not appear that Witness 39 was actually, physically incapable of testifying orally or 
coherently due to a mental condition. While perhaps testifying would cause the witness to 
experience an elevated “emotional state” due to their PTSD, the Court did not find that this 
condition made the witness objectively incapable of testifying. “Incapable” as used by the Court 
suggests actual physical or mental impairment that would literally, physically prevent them from 
attending a Court hearing and testifying, or a mental incapacity such that a witness literally 
cannot respond to the questions put to him in a coherent manner. The Court thus distinguished a 
mental, arguably emotional, disorder and an actual incapacitation of a witness for testimony. The 
former, weighed against the concerns of the Tribunal for a fair trial for the Accused and the 
aptness of Witness 39’s testimony, did not amount to a sufficient reason to bar testimony, and the 
Court refused the Prosecution’s motion. However, on November 4, 2011, the Prosecution filed a 
motion asking the Court to admit Witness 39’s written testimony in lieu of presence, under Rule 
92bis. Rule 29bis allows the admission of written evidence in place of oral testimony in cases 
where the information therein does not disclose specific acts of the Accused. The Court granted 
the motion on the grounds that Witness 39’s testimony would be redacted of any information 
going directly to the actions of the Accused during the indictment period.  
¶79 In another witness-driven motion, the Court established a new criterion for determining 
whether a witness’s prior testimony in other cases can be admitted as evidence in the relevant 
case at hand. The Prosecution filed a motion to admit testimony from seven witnesses from other 
related cases pending before the Tribunal, charging that they contained information directly 
related to the case against Tolimir. In considering whether this type of evidence should be 
admitted, the Court established that it would consider four key factors:  
¶80 The amount of time proposed to be saved by admitting the prior testimony, the volume of 
the prior testimony, the degree of overlap between the topics covered in the prior testimony and 
the topics anticipated to be covered during the witness’s examination in the instant case, and the 




timing of the witness’s testimony i.e. the amount of time the Accused will have to review the 
evidence proffered by the Prosecution through its motion.  
¶81 In weighing the Prosecution’s contentions against these factors and in light of the concerns 
about a fair trial, the Court granted the admission of testimony from only two of the seven 
witnesses called forth by the Prosecution.  
¶82 The trial of Tolimir commenced on February 26, 2010, and the Prosecution has since 
rested its case. On December 16, 2011, the Trial Court issued an order, setting the date of the 
commencement of the Defense’s case for January 23, 2012. 
I. Momčilo Perišić (IT-04-81)9 
1. Judgment Summary 
¶83 On September 6, 2011, the Trial Court issued its judgment. By a two-to-one majority, the 
Court convicted Perišić on charges of aiding and abetting war crimes committed by the Army of 
the Republika Srpska (“VRS”) in the siege of Sarajevo and the Srebenrica massacre. Judge 
Moleto based his dissent on his belief that the assistance Perišić provided to the VRS was remote 
and his contention that in cases of remote assistance, the assistance must be specifically directed 
to perpetuate the crimes to support a conviction for aiding and abetting. The majority, citing 
Blagojevic, held that specific direction was not required. They found that the commission of war 
crimes was part of VRS strategy and that the VRS depended on the assistance of Perišić to 
operate, and thus that assistance was enough to convict Perišić of aiding and abetting. 
¶84 Also by a two-to-one majority, Judge Moleto dissenting, the Court convicted Perišić of 
failing to punish subordinates for crimes relating to the shelling of Zagreb by the Army of the 
Serbian Krajina (“SVK”). Moleto believed the evidence was insufficient to establish that Perišić 
had effective control over the troops involved. 
¶85 The Court unanimously acquitted Perišić of aiding and abetting extermination in 
Srebrenica on the grounds that he could not have foreseen the scale of the crimes there. The 
Court also acquitted him of superior responsibility for failing to prevent or punish the crimes in 
Sarajevo and Srebrenica on the grounds that he lacked the requisite effective control over the 
perpetrators.  
2. Background 
¶86 The charges stem from Perišić’s decision, as Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army 
(“VJ”), to provide support to the VRS and SVK through the creation of Personnel Centres (PCs) 
and other logistical assistance. 
¶87 The Personnel Centres were created by Perišić to facilitate the transfer members of the VJ 
to the VRS and SVK.  They allowed for the VJ to continue paying salary and benefits of those 
serving in the other armies.  Members of the 30th Personnel Centre, serving in the VRS, 
organized and participated in a shelling and sniping campaign directed at civilians in the VRS’ 
siege of Sarajevo between August 1993 and November 1995.  Troops from the 30th Personnel 
Centre had a similar role in the VRS’s attempts to eliminate the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica in 
July 1995.  Finally, on May 2, 1995, General Celeketic, a member of the 40th Personnel Centre 
serving in the SVK, ordered his troops to fire rockets into Zagreb, killing civilians.  
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¶88 Perišić, through his creation of these Personnel Centres and the provision of additional 
logistical support to the VRS, was accused of having personally aided and abetted crimes in 
Sarajevo and Srebrenica and, as members of the Personnel Centres were still part of the VJ, was 
accused of failing to prevent or punish the crimes of his subordinates for all three incidents. 
3. Judgment 
¶89 On September 6, 2011, the Trial Court issued its Judgment on the above charges.  By a 
two-to-one majority, Judge Moleto dissenting, the Court found Perišić guilty, under article 7(1) 
personal responsibility, of aiding and abetting:  
1. Murder as a crime against humanity in relation to Sarajevo.   
2. Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war in relation to Sarajevo.  
3. Inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians) as a crime against humanity in relation to 
Sarajevo. 
4. Attacks on civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war in relation to Saraejvo.  
5. Murder as a crime against humanity in relation to Srebrenica. 
6. Murder as a violation of the laws and customs of war in relation to Srebrenica. 
7. Inhumane acts (inflicting serious injuries, wounding, forcible transfer) as a crime against 
humanity in relation to Srebrenrica. 
8. Persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds as a crime against humanity in 
relation to Srebrenrica. 
¶90 Also by a two-to-one majority, Judge Moleto dissenting, the Court found Perišić guilty, 
under article 7(3) superiority for failing to punish his subordinates for: 
1. Murder as a crime against humanity in relation to Zagreb. 
2. Murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war in relation to Zagreb.  
3. Inhumane Acts (injuring and wounding civilians) as a crime against humanity in relation to 
Zagreb. 
4. Attacks on Civilians as a violation of the laws or customs of war in relation to Zagreb. 
¶91 The Court unanimously found Perišić not guilty of aiding and abetting extermination as a 
crime against humanity in relation to Srebrenica and not guilty of all superior responsibility for 
failure to punish subordinates relating to the crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.  
4. Reasoning 
¶92 The judgment began by establishing that the VRS and the SVK, with members of the 30th 
and 40th Personnel Centres participating and in leadership roles, did in fact commit the crimes 
alleged.  
¶93 The issue then became whether Perišić’s actions constituted aiding and abetting of the 
crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica and whether he had sufficient authority to be held responsible 
for failure to punish those crimes along with the shelling of Zagreb. 
5. Regarding the Article 7(1) Crimes for Aiding and Abetting 
i) Required Elements 
¶94 By finding Perišić guilty of aiding in abetting, the majority found he 1) provided practical 
assistance, encouragement, or moral support to the principal perpetrator of the crime, which 2) 
had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and that 3) he knew that his acts assisted 




the commission of the crime by the principal perpetrator. To satisfy the third element it is 
necessary that Perišić was aware of the state of mind of the perpetrators, but not that he shared 
the mens rea required for the crime. 
a) Element 1: Provision of Assistance 
¶95 The majority found that, while the VJ had provided logistical assistance prior to Perišić’s 
appointment, he “efficiently continued” that assistance, particularly the provision of personnel, 
weapons, ammunition, technical experts, training, medical support, fuel, and operational support.  
b) Element 2: Substantial Effect on the Perpetration of the Crime 
¶96 Importantly, the majority conceded that there was little to no evidence that the specific 
weapons used in the crimes were provided by Perišić’s assistance, but held that the acts of an 
“aider and abettor need not have been specifically directed to assist the crimes.” Rather, the 
majority found that the commission of crimes was a vital part of VRS strategy and that the 
VRS’s general war efforts were dependent on the assistance provided by Perišić and held that the 
assistance thus had the necessary substantial effect on the commission of the crimes. Judge 
Moleto disagreed with the holding that specific direction was not necessary (discussed in dissent 
section below.)  
¶97 The majority first examined the VRS’ war strategy, and concluded that it encompassed the 
commission of crimes. The majority wrote that the VRS made “no clear distinction between 
military warfare against BiH forces and crimes against civilians and/or persons not taking active 
part in hostilities. To the contrary, these crimes were inextricably linked to the war strategy and 
objectives of the VRS leadership.” The Court noted in particular that one of the six published 
“strategic objectives” of the VSR was the partition of Sarejevo into separate Serbian and Muslim 
sectors. 
¶98 Beyond finding that the crimes were a part of the VRS’ war strategy, the majority found 
that the VRS was dependent on the assistance provided by Perišić.  
¶99 The majority cited statements from Karadžić and Mladić that the VRS would be unable to 
operate without assistance from the VJ and Perišić’s own comments that both the VRS and SVK 
obtained logistics mostly from the VJ to determine that both the VRS and SVK were 
“dependent” upon the assistance Perišić arranged. 
¶100 The majority rejected the argument that because the overall proportion of VRS military 
personnel in the PCs was small, the assistance did not facilitate crimes. The Court held that it 
must assess the qualitative aspects of the assistance instead of the quantitative and that 
qualitatively, many of the individuals from the PCs held key positions in the VRS and the 
specific units that committed the crimes. Thus the majority concluded the payment of salaries 
and benefits, combined with the provision of other assistance and supplies, were vitally 
necessary to the very function of the VRS. As the crimes were a part of VRS strategy, the 
majority concluded they were facilitated by such assistance. 
c) Element 3: Knowledge 
¶101 Citing media reports, diplomatic cables, and U.N. reports, the majority was also satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Perišić was or should have been aware of the VRS’s criminal 
strategy and knew his actions provided practical assistance to those crimes. In his dissent, Moleto 
argued that this evidence was insufficient to establish Perišić’s knowledge of VRS strategy 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 




¶102 The Court unanimously found that the Prosecution did not establish, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Perišić knew or should have known the massive scale of the Srebrenica killing.  Thus, 
they found the mental element was not established regarding the charge of aiding and abetting 
extermination in Srebrenica and acquitted him of that count.  
6. Judge Moleto’s Dissent Regarding the Article 7 (1) Convictions. 
¶103 Judge Moleto argued that Perišić’s assistance was too general to constitute aiding and 
abetting the crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.  He agreed with the majority’s conclusion that 
the VRS was dependent upon the assistance of the VJ, but argued it was “inappropriate to infer 
ipso facto on the notion of dependence that Perišić’s assistance had a substantial effect on the 
commission of crimes.” He argued that no superior has been charged with aiding and abetting the 
crimes of his soldiers merely because he supplied them with arms, sent them to war and they 
committed crimes. He reasons that if no superior has been charged under such conditions Perišić 
should not be, especially in light of the fact that he supplied not his own soldiers, but the soldiers 
of another army.  
¶104 Moleto claimed that, by convicting Perišić for aiding and abetting based on his knowledge 
of the strategic objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership, the majority conflated aiding and 
abetting with JCE. 
¶105 Judge Moleto noted that the majority relied on the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in 
Blagojevic in reaching its conclusion that “specific direction” is not an essential element of 
aiding and abetting. He, however, noted that Blagojevic further held specific direction “will often 
be implicit in the finding that the [A]ccused has provided practical assistance to the principal 
perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.” He interpreted these 
statements to mean “there is no additional requirement in the notion of aiding and abetting 
beyond the requirement that the assistance had a substantial effect on the crimes.” Moleto 
contended that a direct link must “be established between the conduct of the aider and abettor 
and the commission of the crimes.” Thus, Moleto argued, in cases of remote or general 
assistance, specific direction must be an integral and explicit element of aiding and abetting. 
Moleto found the conclusion that the “assistance provided was directed at supporting the war 
effort and not to the commission of crimes” was an alternative reasonable explanation and that 
Perišić should not be found guilty of the 7(1) accusations. 
¶106 Judge Moleto also argued that the mental element had not been fulfilled. He argued the 
evidence presented did not establish as the only reasonable inference that Perišić was aware of 
the commission of crimes by the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. 
7. Regarding the 7(3) Superior Responsibility Claims 
¶107 In convicting Perišić under article 7(3) responsibility the Court found “that a superior-
subordinate relationship existed between Perišić and the perpetrators of the crimes; that Perišić 
knew or had reason to know that the crimes were about to be, or had been, committed; and 
finally, that he failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or 
punish the perpetrators thereof. The existence of whether a superior-subordinate relationship 
existed depends on an affirmative answer to: 1) whether at the time of the commission of the 
crimes the perpetrators were subordinates of the superior; and 2) whether the latter exercised 
effective control over them.” It was established that Perišić knew that the crimes had been 




committed and that he had taken no action to punish the perpetrators and the discussion focused 
on whether a superior-subordinate relationship existed.   
¶108 The majority, Moleto dissenting, found that Perišić had such a relationship with the 40th 
Personnel Centre, which committed the crimes in Zagreb. The Judges unanimously found that no 
such relationship existed with the 30th Personnel Centre, which committed the crimes in Sarajevo 
and Srebrenica.  
i) Element 1: That the Perpetrators were Subordinates of the Accused 
¶109 The Defense argued that the perpetrators were not subordinates of Perišić because the VRS 
and SVK constituted separate entities from the VJ. The Court, however, found that many of the 
perpetrators of the crimes in question were members of the 30th and 40th PCs and that members 
of the PC were de jure members of the VJ and thus Perišić’s subordinates. 
ii) Element 2: Effective Control 
¶110 The Court then turned to analyzing whether Perišić had effective control over the 30th and 
40th PCs. They stressed that the de jure authority previously established provides only some 
evidence of effective control and then outlined 7 indicators of effective control: 
1. Whether Perišić had the ability to discipline and to punish the 30th and the 
40th PC members. 
2. Whether Perišić had the authority to issue binding orders to the 30th and the 40th PC 
members, including both transfer/appointment orders and command orders. 
3. Whether Perišić was involved in the payment of salaries and provision of other benefits for 
the 30th and the 40th PC members. 
4. Whether Perišić had the capacity to promote members of the 30th and the 40th PC 
members. 
5. Whether Perišić had the authority to terminate the professional military service of the 30th 
and the 40th PC members. 
6. Whether the SVK and the VRS depended on VJ logistical support. 
7. Whether the SVK and VRS reported to the VJ General Staff. 
8. 40th PC- Zagreb 
¶111 A weighing of these factors led the majority to conclude that Perišić had effective control 
over, and a superior-subordinate relationship with, members of the 40th PC who were involved in 
the shelling of Zagreb. Perišić’s ability to order VJ members in the 40th PC to specific posts 
within the SVK bore little weight because it was control he had before the soldiers entered the 
SVK’s chain of command and not at the time of the crimes. Similarly, even though Perišić 
ordered transfers of 40th PC personnel back to the VJ and these orders were obeyed, they 
required at least formal consent from the SVK and this also carried little weight.  However, the 
majority found that Perišić could initiate disciplinary proceedings against 40th PC members and it 
was only Perišić’s own policy of secrecy that caused such proceedings to be infrequent. The 
majority also found that, while he actually did so infrequently, Perišić had the authority to issue 
orders to members of the 40th PC. The Court conceded there were some instances of non-
compliance with Perišić’s orders, but that this occurred when there was a conflicting parallel 
order from SVK leadership and that these instances did not show a lack of authority. Perišić’s 
ability to make independent recommendations with respect to verification of promotions and to 




terminate the professional contracts of VJ soldiers serving in the 40th PC also weighed in favor of 
finding effective control. 
9. 30th PC Sarajevo and Srebrenica 
¶112 The Court found that the evidence did not establish that Perišić could issue binding orders 
to members of the 30th PC serving in the VRS, pointing to a divergence of views between him 
and the VRS commander Mladić. The Court also found that while Perišić could initiate 
disciplinary proceedings against 30th PC members, the initiation was conditioned on a decision 
from officers in the VRS and that Perišić’s role was auxiliary. The Court found that Perišić could 
influence redeployment, promotional, and termination decisions but distinguished this influence 
from effective control and found that his material ability to prevent or punish subordinates was 
called into question by his secondary role in the disciplinary process. They thus found that 
effective control was not present, a superior-subordinate relationship did not exist, and that 
Perišić was not guilty for failure to prevent or punish perpetrators of the Srebrenica or Sarajevo 
crimes. 
10. Judge Moleto’s Dissent 
¶113 Judge Moleto disagreed with the majority’s finding that Perišić could issue command 
orders to members serving in the 40th PC. He argued the only evidence as a single written order 
given by Perišić that was expressly written on the authority of Slobodan Milošević. Further, he 
noted that one of the addressees of the order was Milan Martić who was not a member of the 40th 
PC, that reasons were provided for the issuance (inconsistent with an order), that one of the 
reasons for the issuance was that Martić had made a promise (implying that it was more of a 
reminder of a promise than an order), and that one of the recipients addressed his response to 
Milošević and not Perišić. From these facts Judge Moleto concluded that this was not evidence 
of the ability to issue orders. Further, he found that existence of a parallel chain of command in 
SVK leadership undermined a finding of effective control. Finally, he pointed out that one of 
Perišić’s ignored orders was his command that Celeketic cease the shelling in Zagreb. Judge 
Moleto found Celeketic’s disregard of this order a “clear demonstration” of the lack of effective 
control. 
J. Karadžić (IT-95-5/18-I)10 
¶114 The trial began in 2009 and is expected to last until 2014.  2011 has produced a few 
different points of legal contention, some of which remain unresolved. 
1. Standard of Review for Reconsideration of Protective Measures 
¶115 Karadžić argued that when an order for protective measures as granted ex parte and the 
Defense wasas not given an opportunity to oppose the motion, a subsequent motion to reconsider 
the order should be evaluated de novo instead of the “clear error” standard the Trial Chamber 
used. 
¶116 The Tribunal has not ruled on the merits of the appeal. The Trial Chamber denied the 
application for interlocutory appeal on the grounds that the issue failed both prongs of the two-
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pronged test for interlocutory appeal of 1) whether the resolution of the dispute would affect the 
fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings or the outcome of the trial, and 2) whether an 
immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber would materially advance the proceedings. 
2. Declaratory Relief in Disclosure Violation Motions 
¶117 The Prosecution filed an application for certification for interlocutory appeal regarding the 
required elements for the granting of a disclosure violation motion. On March 29, 2011, the 
Court ruled on Karadžić’s 37th to 42nd disclosure violation motions. Despite finding that 
Karadžić was not prejudiced by any of the violations, the Court granted, by majority, five of the 
six motions and declared that the Prosecution violated Rule 68 regarding disclosures. 
¶118 Judge Kwon dissented from the ruling on the motions, arguing that prejudice was an 
essential element to grant a disclosure violation motion, and in its absence “it is unnecessary, 
moot or even frivolous to issue a declaratory finding that the Prosecution has violated Rule 68.” 
¶119 In its application for certification of appeal, the Prosecution repeated Judge Kwon’s 
arguments. The Trial Chamber found, however, that that issue did not satisfy the two-prong test 
and denied the opportunity for interlocutory appeal. 
3. Motion to Subpoena Miroslav Tuñman/Immunity for Intelligence Officials 
¶120 On July 14, 2011, the Trial Chamber granted Karadžić’s motion to subpoena Miroslav 
Tuñman. Tuñman declined an invitation to voluntarily submit to be interviewed by Karadžić’s 
defense team and argued that intelligence officials were immune from subpoenas or binding 
orders under the Tribunal Appeals Chamber decision in Krstić 
¶121 The Court found that the requirements for issuing a subpoena were met and ruled that 
“functional immunity” was clarified in Krstić as limited to applications of production of state 
documents and that it was “not apt in relation to a state official who can give evidence of 
something he saw or heard.”    
4. Monitoring of Phone Calls 
¶122 The President of the Tribunal denied Karadžić’s request for an amicus curiae investigation 
into the inappropriate disclosure of Slobodan Milošević’s monitored phone calls on the grounds 
that Karadžić had no standing to bring such a request. 
¶123 The President also denied Karadžić’s request that detention center officials submit 
statements regarding whether any information obtained from Karadžić’s phone calls was 
revealed to third parties. The President reasoned that it was unreasonable to infer from violations 
regarding disclosure of information relating to Milošević that disclosures of a similar nature 
regarding Karadžić may have occurred.   
5. Case Background and Indictment 
¶124 The indictment alleged that, from at least October 1991 until November 30, 1995, Karadžić 
participated in an overarching JCE to permanently remove Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat 
inhabitants from the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina claimed as Bosnian Serb territory. It 
further alleged that between April 1992 and November 1995, Karadžić participated in a JCE to 
establish and carry out a campaign of sniping and shelling against the civilian population of 
Sarajevo, the primary purpose of which was to spread terror among the civilian population. This 




objective involved the commission of the crimes of terror, unlawful attacks on civilians, and 
murder charged in the indictment. The indictment further alleged that from July 11, 1995, to 
November 1, 1995, Karadžić participated in a JCE to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in 
Srebrenica by killing the men and boys of Srebrenica and forcibly removing the women, young 
children and some elderly men from Srebrenica. Karadzic is also charged on the basis of 
individual criminal responsibility and superior criminal responsibility with genocide under article 
4, crimes against humanity under article 5, including persecutions, extermination, murder, 
deportation, and inhumane acts, and war crimes under article 3, including murder, unlawful 
attacks on civilians, acts of violence the primary purpose of which was to spread terror among 
the civilian population, and taking of hostages. 
K. Popović et al. (IT-05-88) “Srebrenica”11 
1. 2011 Developments 
¶125 The judgment against Vujadin Popović, Ljubiša Beara, Drago Nikolić, Ljubomir 
Borovčanin, Radivoje Miletić, Milan Gvero and Vinko Pandurević came down on June 10, 2010. 
Vujadin Popovic, Ljubisa Beara, Drago Nikolić, and Radivoje Miletić have all filed notices of 
appeal. Borovčanin decided not to appeal and on November 10, 2011, he was transferred to 
Denmark to serve his 17-year sentence. As of now, only Beara and Nikolić have filed their 
appellate briefs. 
2. Pre-2011 Background 
i) Indictment and Charges 
¶126 All of the Defendants were charged in connection with the Srebrenica Massacre that took 
place in July 1995. Beara, Popović and Drago Nikolić were charged on the basis of their 
individual criminal responsibility (article 7(1) of the Statute) with: 
 Genocide (article 4) 
 Conspiracy to commit genocide (article 4) 
 Extermination, murder, persecutions, forcible transfer and deportation (crimes 
against humanity, article 5) 
 Murder (violations of the laws or customs of war, article 3) 
¶127 Pandurević and Borovčanin are charged on the basis of their individual criminal 
responsibility (article 7(1) of the Statute) and on the basis of their superior criminal responsibility 
(article 7(3) of the Statute) with: 
 Genocide (article 4) 
 Conspiracy to commit genocide (article 4) 
 Extermination, murder, persecutions, forcible transfer and deportation (crimes 
against humanity, article 5) 
 Murder (violations of the laws or customs of war, article 3) 
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¶128 Miletić and Gvero are charged on the basis on their individual criminal responsibility 
(article 7(1) of the Statute) with: 
 Murder, persecutions, forcible transfer and deportation (crimes) 
3. Judgment 
¶129 The Trial Chamber found that there was a JCE to murder and a JCE to forcibly remove. 
The Chamber further found that some members of the JCE had genocidal intent to murder and 
thus genocide was committed. It also found that members of both JCEs had the requisite special 
intent for the crime of persecution. It was also established beyond a reasonable doubt that there 
was a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population. This attack commenced 
with the issuance of Directive 7 and had various components, including the strangulation of the 
enclaves through the restriction of humanitarian supplies, the gradual weakening and disabling of 
UNPROFOR and a planned military assault on the enclaves, and culminated in the removal of 
thousands of people from Srebrenica and Žepa. Therefore, applying the legal elements of the 
crimes charged in the indictment to the facts found to be proven, the Trial Chamber found that 
the following crimes were committed by members of the Bosnian Serb forces in various 
locations alleged in the indictment: genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; extermination, a 
crime against humanity; murder, a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or customs 
of war; murder, cruel and inhumane treatment, terrorizing civilians, and forcible transfer, as acts 
of persecution, a crime against humanity; and forcible transfer as an inhumane act, a crime 
against humanity. The Trial Chamber found that the elements of the crime of deportation had not 
been established. In addition, individual criminal responsibility was found against all defendants. 
4. Sentences 
 Popović- Sentenced to life imprisonment 
 Beara- Sentenced to life imprisonment 
 Nikolić- Sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment 
 Borovčanin- Sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment 
 Miletić- Sentenced to 19 years’ imprisonment 
 Gvero- Sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment (granted early release on June 
28, 2010) 
 Pandurević- Sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment 
5. Arguments in Beara and Nikolic Briefs 
¶130 Beara filed his brief on June 16, 2011, alleging 41 errors in the trial judgment. The vast 
majority are allegations that the Trial Chamber simply erred in conclusions of fact but some 
assert errors in law. Ground 22 alleges that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that conspiracy 
under the Genocide Convention necessarily implies a continuing crime and that by finding Beara 
guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide they violated the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, 
which prohibits retroactive application of law. 
¶131 The brief acknowledged that conspiracy is treated as a continuing crime in common law 
countries but attempted to distinguish the specific crime of conspiracy to commit genocide.  
Pointing to the records of drafting meetings, the Defense argued that the “aim of the Convention 




is to prevent genocide, rather than punish it” and that conspiracy was defined as “the agreement 
of two or more persons to commit an unlawful act” from which it concluded that it was unclear if 
the drafters intended for conspiracy to encompass the common law approach. The Defense 
attempted to further distinguish the charge of JCE by citing the decision in Milutinović that 
“criminal liability pursuant to JCE is not a liability for…conspiring to commit crimes.” 
¶132 Ground 30 argued that Beara was convicted of persecutions through “opportunistic” 
killings but that persecution required an element of special intent that was not required for 
opportunistic crimes falling under the JCE III mode of liability under which he was convicted. 
¶133 Nikolić’s brief contained 26 grounds of objection, the majority of which were also disputes 
of factual findings. Ground 3 argued that the Trial Chamber failed in the identification of the 
legal elements of genocide by finding that state policy was not an essential legal element of the 
crime of genocide. The Trial Chamber found that these arguments had already been considered 
by the jurisprudence of the ICTY and Nikolić disagreed. In particular, Nikolić argued that the 
Trial Chamber’s invocation of Krstić (“the offence of genocide…does not require proof of…. a 
widespread and systematic attack”) was flawed on the grounds that a widespread and systematic 
attack is not equated with state policy. The Court also relied on Jelisić in which the Appeals 
Chamber found “the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient” of genocide, but 
Nikolić countered that the context indicated that the conclusion was limited to manners of 
proving intent, not as a separate element. 
¶134 Ground 7 was that the Trial Chamber violated its obligation to “specify the common 
criminal purpose of both the goal intend and its scope.” The Prosecution alleged that the JCE 
intended to murder all able-bodied Muslim men from Srebrenica but, in determining whether the 
record supported that purpose, the Chamber only found that Bosnian Serb forces executed 
“several thousand Bosnian Muslim males.“ Nikolić argued that this finding merely describes 
ensuing events and did not specify the common purpose. 
¶135 Ground 16 was that witness Acimovic, who was the only witness implicating Nikolić in 
crimes in Ročević, was not credible and that the manner in which he received orders was not 
peripheral. Acimovic made inconsistent statements regarding the receipt of an order including 
the manner in which he had received it and his knowledge of who signed the telegram in which 
he later claimed to receive it. The brief specifically focused on Acimovic’s claim that the 
telegram was coded despite the lack of capacity of his battalion to decode telegrams and on his 
claim to lack knowledge of the source of the telegram despite the fact that it was an official 
message. During trial, the Chamber gave the Prosecution leave to present rebuttal evidence 
because the issue of the telegrams was “significant” yet in the judgment they found the issue 
peripheral. Nikolić argued that it was not peripheral but undermined the credibility of Acimovic, 
who was the only witness that implicated him in crimes in Ročević, and was thus exculpatory in 
regards to those crimes. 
L. Šešelj – IT-03-6712 
1. Procedural Facts 
¶136 The OTP has finished presenting its case in chief and the Trial Chamber denied Defense’s 
motion for acquittal under Rule 98bis. The Defense is currently presenting its case. 
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¶137 Vojislav Šešelj was a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. He founded and 
led the Serbian Radical Party. The third amended indictment was filed on December 7, 2007. 
The indictment alleged that Šešelj was involved in a JCE, which aimed at permanent removal of 
non-Serbian people from their original areas through criminal activity.  
¶138 Šešelj was charged on the basis of individual criminal responsibility (article 7(1) of the 
Statute). Under article 5 (crimes against humanity), Šešelj was charged with persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds, deportation, inhumane acts (forcible transfer), and murder, 
torture, cruel treatment, wanton destruction of villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity, destruction or willful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion or education, 
plunder of public or private property under article 3 (violations of the laws or customs of war). 
3. 2011 Decisions and Orders 
¶139 The Trial Chamber denied Defense’s motion for acquittal under Rule 98bis. The Chamber 
was convinced that there was sufficient evidentiary basis under Rule 98bis to continue the case 
so as to let a reasonable fact finder decide whether to convict the Accused. Judge Antonetti 
dissented, holding that the Accused should be acquitted for part of the indictments including 
crimes of murder, wanton destruction, plunder, torture, and cruel treatment under counts 4, 7, 8. 
9, 12, 13, and 14. 
¶140 The Trial Chamber issued numerous decisions on motions to reconsider the admissibility 
of evidence that were denied or partially granted before.  
¶141 The Trial Chamber issued a decision with regard to when Šešelj’s health examination 
report, written by a medical expert panel, would be filed. Also, the Trial Chamber denied 
Šešelj’s request for access to the confidential internal memorandum of the Registry regarding the 
technicalities of appointing a panel of experts.  
¶142 The Trial Chamber faced motions related to disclosure of confidential exhibits in the Šešelj 
case to other defendants who requested those exhibits to prepare their defenses, including 
Radovan Karadzic, Mićo Stanisić, and Franko Simatović. The Trial Chamber granted those 
motions, some partially, in reference to, inter alia, article 21 of the Statute of the Tribunal, Rule 
68, and Rule 70. The Chamber approved the disclosure of confidential exhibits both admitted to 
evidence and not admitted in the Šešelj case to those moving parties, as long as there was 
sufficient nexus between those materials and they are indeed helpful for those parties to prepare 
their defense, if there is no other restriction such as confidential ex parte documents. 
¶143 The Trial Chamber denied Mr. Šešelj’s motion wherein he requested the Tribunal 
discontinue the proceedings due to process abuse. Šešelj claimed that as he has been detained for 
eight years and the trial has not reached the judgment stage, his right not to be subjected to a trial 
with undue delay was violated. However, Trial Chamber denied his motion. The Chamber was 
satisfied that the Accused was well represented and his rights were not violated during the 
process, and it failed to find any specific time limit beyond which the trial should be regarded as 
unduly protracted and unfair from the perspective of international and European case law. 




M. Stanišić and Simatović (IT-03-69)13 
¶144 On May 5, 2011, the Trial Chamber held, pursuant to Rule 98bis, that there was a cause of 
action, and dismissed Simatović’s motion to dismiss. The Defense case is currently underway. 
The main issue at this stage is the admissibility of evidence presented by the Defense. 
1. Indictment 
¶145 Jovica Stanišić was the former Chief of the State Security Service (DB), and Franko 
Simatović was the former Commander of Special Operation Unit of the DB. They were charged 
on the basis of individual criminal responsibility (article 7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal) for 
persecutions on political racial or religious grounds, murder, deportation, and inhumane acts 
(forcible transfer) under article 5, and for murder under article 3.  
2. Trial 
¶146 This case was protracted for a long time due to the poor health of defendants and the death 
of lead Defense Counsel. After the OTP concluded presenting its case, defendant Simatović filed 
a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Chamber denied. 
3. 2011 Decisions and Orders  
¶147 At trial, evidence admissibility has been very contentious. The Trial Chamber ruled on the 
admissibility of evidence from the Defense by considering three factors: authenticity, relevance, 
and probative value. The Trial Chamber remarked that it was indicia of authenticity where 
evidence was derived from a government or public institution of a state where the alleged crimes 
happened. All of the documents provided by the countries’ government must reach the standard 
of authenticity. 
¶148 On May 5, 2011, before the presentation of the Defense’s case, the Trial Chamber denied 
the Defense’s motion for acquittal through an oral order on the basis that it was satisfied that the 
OTP presented sufficient evidentiary basis for the alleged crimes and concluded that there was 
enough evidence to support that the Accused should be responsible for those alleged crimes. 
¶149 The Trial Chamber granted the Prosecution’s request to videoconference with witness JF-
061 due to his son’s and his own health conditions. After balancing the potential risks to the 
witness against the defendants’ right to public trial, Trial Chamber granted protective measures 
for witness JF-061 by proceeding in closed session and using pseudonyms. The Chamber based 
this decision on articles 20 and 22 of the Statute of the Tribunal, and on Rules 75 and 81bis. 
¶150 The Trial Chamber filed two decisions with regard to the Defense’s request for 
certification to appeal. 
¶151 The Trial Chamber granted Stanišić’s motion to add witness DST-081 to his witness list. 
¶152 The Trial Chamber granted in part the Simatović urgent motion for provisional release. 
The Chamber determined that the Defendant must be present during the Rule 98bis hearing, and 
the requested provisional release should be considered separately in two periods. The Chamber 
referred to governing law and approved the provisional release for the first period before the 
Rule 98bis hearing, which had been arranged, on the condition that the defendant would appear 
for trial again, would not threaten other people, and the release would be beneficial to the 
                                                 
13 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović, IT-03-69, http://www.icty.org/case/stanisic_ simatovic/4. 




Defense preparation. The Chamber denied provisional release for the second stage holding that 
there were no compelling humanitarian grounds, which were necessary for a decision granting 
provisional release. 
¶153 The Appeal Chamber dismissed Frano Simatović’s appeal against the decision denying his 
urgent request for provisional release. 
¶154 The Trial Chamber denied Stanišić’s motion for equality of arms and immediate 
suspension of the trial. 
¶155 The Registry made a decision to change assignment of Defense Counsel. 
¶156 The Trial Chamber granted the Defense motion for leave to exceed the word limit, but 
denied Defense’s request to provide remedy analysis for and considering as evidence the 
Prosecution’s non-compliance with Rule 90(H) of the Rule of Procedure and Evidence when 
cross-examining Defense Witnesses. 
¶157 The OTP filed a motion for submission on additional victims. The Trial Chamber granted 
the motion, but the Chamber held that the evidence did not require amending the operative 
indictment because the Accused were participating in the alleged crimes through planning, 
preparation and execution, and not physically. So, the specific names of victims have no effect 
the defendants’ criminal liability. 
N. Milan Lukić & Sredoje Lukić (IT-98-32/1) "Višegrad"14 
1. Procedural Facts 
¶158 The appeal from both the Defense and the OTP was heard on September 14 and 15, 2011. 
The Appeal Chamber remains in review. 
2. Indictment 
¶159 The operative indictment was filed on February 27, 2006, after being amended twice. The 
indictment alleges that Milan Lukić organized a group of local paramilitaries with ties to the 
Visegrad police and Serb military units, which were sometimes referred to as the "White Eagles" 
and "Avengers." Before the war, Sredoje Lukić was a Visegrad policeman and upon the war’s 
commencement he joined a group of paramilitaries set up by Milan Lukić. They allegedly 
committed and aided and abetted crimes against humanity through the persecution of non-
Serbian civilians on political, racial or religious grounds in Visegrad.  
¶160 Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić, with specific intent to discriminate on political, racial or 
religious grounds, are alleged to have committed the crime of persecution and, with the 
awareness of the discriminatory intent of other perpetrators, aided and abetted in the execution of 
the crime of persecution.  
¶161 Milan Lukić was charged on the basis of individual criminal responsibility (article 7(1) of 
the Statute of the Tribunal) with persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; murder; 
inhumane acts; and extermination (crimes against humanity, article 5), and murder and cruel 
treatment (violations of laws or customs of war, article 3) 
¶162 Sredoje Lukić was charged on the basis of individual criminal responsibility (article 7(1) of 
the Statute of the Tribunal) with persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, 
extermination, murder; and inhumane acts (crimes against humanity, article 5), and murder and 
cruel treatment (violations of laws or customs of war, article 3). 
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¶163 The trial commenced on July 9, 2008, and a judgment was rendered on July 20, 2009. 
3. Appeal 
¶164 On August 19, 2009, both Defense teams filed their notices of appeal, and the Prosecution 
filed a notice of appeal with regard to Sredoje Lukić. On November 2, 2009, the OTP and 
defendant Sredoje Lukić filed their appeal briefs. On March 17, 2010, the Defense of Milan 
Lukić filed its appeal brief. The appeals hearing is scheduled to take place on September 14 and 
15, 2011. 
4. 2011 Decisions and Orders  
¶165 The Appeals Chamber denied Milan Lukić’s motion to admit additional evidence on 
appeal. 
¶166 The Appeals Chamber issued an order instructing parties on what would be at issue at the 
appeal hearing.  
¶167 The President issued two orders to revise the panel of appellate judges. 
5. Issues for Appeal 
¶168 Lukić submitted eight grounds of appeal, which predominantly focused on two issues. The 
first concerned the Trial Chamber’s holding that witnesses at the crime scene recognized Lukić 
on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence supporting this recognition. Second is that the 
Chamber found that two crimes allegedly committed by Lukić constituted “killing on a large 
scale” so as to satisfy the requirement of extermination, and Lukić contended that those two 
crimes should not be regarded as “massive” or “on a large scale” based on international law and 
the Tribunal’s case law.  
¶169 Regarding the first issue, the Defense first criticized the Trial Chamber’s lack of a rigorous 
and correct standard when considering and scrutinizing the evidence that purported to identify 
the perpetrator. Second, the Defense cast doubt upon the ability of witnesses to recognize the 
perpetrator years after the commission of the crimes. Third, the Defense pointed out that the 
Trial Chamber’s holding that Milan Lukić was recognized by witnesses while the Prosecution 
conceded in closing argument that there was insufficient basis for recognition was made in error. 
Fourth, the Defense Counsel rebutted the Prosecution’s argument that the Tribunal found 
recognition was more reliable than the identification. Fifth, the Defense claimed that they did not 
have the opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine because neither of the two witnesses 
who testified to the recognition of Lukić appeared for cross-examination.  
¶170 To the second issue, the Defense pointed out that “massiveness refers to the number of 
victims instead of character of the crime.” The Trial Chamber, however, relied upon the 
character instead of number of victims to reach the extermination. The crime of extermination 
originated at Nuremberg. Pursuant to its origin, the threshold for the number of victims required 
to constitute extermination is 733 compared to the 60 killings in this case. The Defense requested 
the Appeal Chamber be guided by the Martić trial judgment decided by ICTY where the deaths 
of 165 victims could not even be a basis for extermination, and by the 2008 ICTR trial judgment 
of Zigiranyirazo. The Defense moved for a reversal of Milan’s extermination conviction on the 
grounds that the limited number of the victims as not enough to amount to extermination and that 
there was no joint criminal enterprise. 




¶171 In response to Milan Lukić’s submission, the Prosecution addressed the law regarding 
identification evidence and pointed out why Milan “failed to show error in the Trial Chamber’s 
approach to identification,” which was the key evidence in support of the Trial Chamber’s 
conviction. The Prosecution discussed at length how the witnesses could identify Milan Lukić at 
crime scenes. It also discussed the issue of extermination. The Prosecution contended that the 
number of the victims was on a large enough scale to amount to extermination, and the 
contextual factors surrounding each killing also qualified them as extermination. 
¶172 Sredoje submitted five grounds of appeal. Sredoje Lukić’s appeal focused on his 
conviction of aiding and abetting, contending that he was neither present nor armed. The Defense 
contended that the Prosecution had neither proved Sredoje Lukić’s presence at Pionirska Street 
or during the transfer, nor his participation or aiding and abetting the commission of the crimes 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defense Counsel pointed out contradictions between the 
evidence and the witness testimonies that claimed to have identified the Defendant. The Defense 
counsel addressed the dual standard used by the Trial Chamber with respect to the previous 
jurisprudence governing the identification. The Defense Counsel further noted that the 
Prosecution and Chamber accepted the presence of the defendant at only two of the five stages of 
the crime. The Defense argued that no witness truly saw or had the ability to distinguish Sredoje 
Lukić at the scene of the robbery, and the Chamber, with Judge Robinson dissenting, found the 
Accused was present. Additionally, the defendant was unarmed at one of the two stages. Based 
on this factor the defendant could not be found guilty of the crime of aiding and abetting murder 
and inhumane acts because the conviction of the Chamber was based on the assumption that the 
defendant was present and armed at the crime scene. 
¶173 In response to Sredoje Lukić’s submission, the Prosecution addressed the issues the 
defendant raised regarding his responsibility in aiding and abetting the crimes at Pionirska, 
particularly the issue of identification. The Prosecution contended that the witness could 
recognize the Defendant when he was present at the crime scene, that he was armed, and that the 
Defendant positively participated and contributed to the success of the crime. 
¶174 Prosecution submitted two grounds of appeal against the judgment of Sredoje by the Trial 
Chamber. 
6. Further Action  
¶175 The Appeals Chamber heard the Defense on September 14 and 15, 2011. No decision has 
been rendered. 
O. ðorñević (IT-05-87/1) “Kosovo”15 
1. Procedural Facts 
¶176 This case has comleted its trial stage this year and ðorñević received the judgment from 
the Trial Chamber on February 23, 2011. Both the Prosecution and Defense filed appeals. 
2. Indictment  
¶177 ðorñević was the Assistant Minister of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) and 
Chief of the Public Security Department (RJB) of the MUP. His initial indictment was filed 
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October 2, 2003, and was finally decided on June 26, 2006, after having been amended four 
times. He was indicted for crimes against humanity including: deportation, forcible transfer, 
murder, and persecutions, and the war crime of murder against Kosovo Albanians. 
3. Judgment 
i) Issue 1 
¶178 The Chamber found that evidence showed that Kosovo Albanian people were leaving due 
to the violent conduct of Serbian forces, and not for the reasons set forth by the Defense. 
Although the other reasons may have had affected some Kosovo Albanians, the main factor that 
caused the Kosovo Albanians to leave their homes was the Serbian forces’ violent conduct 
against them. The Chamber was thus satisfied that the offences of deportation and forcible 
transfer were established by evidence.  
ii) Issue 2 
¶179 The Chamber was satisfied that the murder of civilians, who were neither armed nor in any 
form of armed conflict, was proven. The Chamber also found that the murders were mostly 
committed by the Serbian police forces, which the defendant was in charge of. The Chamber 
found that the Accused did not commit any crime himself. However, he was criminally 
responsible for the crimes because Serbian forces that committed those crimes were under his 
command. 
iii) Issue 3 
¶180 The Chamber held that persecution through sexual assault was not established since no 
evidence showed the perpetrators acted with the intent to discriminate. 
iv) Issue 4 
¶181 The Defense contended that there was no such plan and the crimes committed in the 
indictment were isolated incidents perpetrated randomly. Also, it contended that the actions by 
Serbian forces were aimed only at “terrorist forces,” which therefore made their actions legal 
under customary international law. The Chamber held that the operations causing the deaths of 
civilian was under the guise of anti-terrorist operations, but the target of the operations was the 
Kosovo Albanian population, and not the KLA. Thus, the Chamber was convinced that the 
Accused participated in a JCE with the purpose of changing the ethnic balance in Kosovo. 
v) Issue 5 
¶182 The Chamber decided that the Defendant actively participated and played a key role in the 
JCE on account of his legal power and effective control over police in Kosovo. The Defendant 
was therefore found responsible for having implemented or contributed to the implementation of 
the plan. 
vi) Issue 6 
¶183 The Chamber rejected Defense’s denial that there were Serbian paramilitary forces during 
the indictment period.   
vii) Issue 7 
¶184 The Defendant played a crucial role in MUP to conceal murders. 




viii) Issue 8  
¶185 The Accused failed to do anything to ensure the investigation of crimes. The Accused’s 
conduct contributed to violence and terror by Serbian forces against Kosovo Albanian people, 
with the purpose of changing the ethnic composition in Kosovo. Therefore, the Chamber held 
that the defendant aided and abetted the crimes alleged in the indictment and participated in the 
JCE. Under article 7(3), he was also responsible for not preventing or punishing the crimes 
committed by Serbian forces under his effective control that time. However, the Chamber could 
not convict the Accused under article 7(3) due to the adverse findings from article 7(1). 
4. Conviction  
 Deportation under article 5 
 Other inhumane acts under article 5 
 Murder under article 5 
 Murder under article 3 
 Persecution under article 5 
5. Sentence:  
¶186 27 years’ imprisonment.  
6. Appeals Proceedings 
¶187 On May 24, 2011, both Parties filed their notices of appeal against the judgment. They 
both later submitted a public redacted version of their appeal briefs—the Prosecution filed theirs 
on August 17, 2011, and the Defense filed theirs on September 30, 2011. The appeal has not 
been heard or scheduled yet. 
7. Grounds for Appeals 
¶188 The Defense’s appeal set forth 19 grounds upon which it tried to prove that the 
Defendant’s conviction and sentence were wrong. Those grounds focus on the existence of the 
JCE, various errors made by the Trial Chamber in findings of fact, and the approach through 
which the Trial Chamber reached their sentence. Additionally defense counsel attacked the 
Chamber’s failure to consider mitigating factors, and identified error in law and facts as to the 
aggravating factors. The Prosecution’s appeal raised two issues—the Defendant’s responsibility 
under count 5 and an inadequate sentence. 
